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Summary box
 ► The value of universal health coverage to popula-
tions, governments, and payers depends on the 
quality of healthcare services provided, requiring 
a coherent strategy that ensures expansion of ser-
vices that are safe to use without inflicting harm to 
patients.
 ► Countries should adopt strategies for priority setting 
based on robust evidence-based methods to avoid 
waste of resources. Low-income and middle-income 
countries can learn and borrow from the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, for ex-
ample, through the International Decision Support 
Initiative.
 ► Boosting public health is a prerequisite to a 
well-functioning healthcare system. Ensuring a 
functioning primary care system to prevent avoid-
able hospitalisation is critical and a priority for the 
population over expensive specialised care.
 ► An independent way of inspecting and regulating 
providers on the quality of care provided is important, 
with transparent publishing of data on performance.
AbSTrACT
Governments across low-income and middle-income 
countries have pledged to achieve universal health 
coverage by 2030, which comes at a time where 
healthcare systems are subjected to multiple and 
persistent pressures, such as poor access to care services 
and insufficient medical supplies. While the political 
willingness to provide universal health coverage is a step 
into the right direction, the benefits of it will depend on 
the quality of healthcare services provided. In this analysis 
paper, we ask whether there are any lessons that could 
be learnt from the English National Health Service, a 
healthcare system that has been providing comprehensive 
and high-quality universal health coverage for over 70 
years. The key areas identified relate to the development 
of a coherent strategy to improve quality, to boost public 
health as a measure to reduce disease burden, to adopt 
evidence-based priority setting methods that ensure 
efficient spending of financial resources, to introduce an 
independent way of inspecting and regulating providers, 
and to allow for task-shifting, specifically in regions where 
staff retention is low.
InTroduCTIon
Healthcare systems in low-income and 
middle-income countries (LMICs) are subject 
to multiple and persistent pressures, often the 
result of weak institutions, corruption and 
difficulties in creating and retaining all of the 
building blocks of a healthcare system.1 This 
can lead to poor access to healthcare services, 
inadequate drugs and medical supplies, and 
labour force shortages. These pressures exist 
at a time when universal health coverage 
(UHC) is a common goal across the world, 
presenting an increased challenge, especially 
for lower resourced countries.2
The concept of UHC is now considered to 
go beyond the three dimensions of popula-
tion, services and costs,3 with an increasing 
focus being placed on ensuring a level of 
quality that helps to improve the health of 
the service seeker. Thus, in the context of 
LMICs, quality refers to the access of safe 
and effective evidence-based treatments, in a 
timely manner, and without discrimination by 
socioeconomic and financial status. Achieving 
high-quality UHC is likely to be expensive to 
government and other payers, depending on 
how the UHC is designed, but with the bene-
fits to individuals, populations and payers 
reliant on the quality of healthcare provided. 
Here we ask whether there are any lessons for 
improvement of quality that could be learnt 
from an existing UHC healthcare system like 
the English National Health Service (NHS).
WHy IS THe experIenCe from THe englISH nHS 
relevAnT for lmICS?
The NHS has been providing UHC to the 
population of England for over 70 years. 
While UHC can take several forms and can 
be achieved through different funding mech-
anisms, for example, through a social health 
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insurance scheme employed in Germany, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland, the NHS is almost entirely funded 
by government (the ‘single payer’) through redistribu-
tion of tax revenue, similar to the health system in Italy 
and Spain. However, the NHS has been unique on the 
universalism it offers to its citizen, because it provides 
comprehensive benefits to all residents, free at the point 
of access regardless of ability to pay, and with next to no 
patient charges. It operates under a fixed budget that 
requires strict measures for cost and quality control, 
with constraining healthcare costs being a challenge 
in the face of increasing demands, not least from an 
ageing population and multiple comorbidities from 
chronic non-communicable disease (NCDs). This is 
similar to many LMICs, where public healthcare services 
are provided by the government and confronted with 
substantial challenges arising from demographic changes 
and people living with chronic conditions. For example, 
half of the total burden of disease in India is the result of 
NCDs,4 and similarly in many sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, demand for healthcare is increasingly shifting away 
from infectious diseases towards chronic conditions like 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease.5
The NHS is unusual as a UHC system, because the 
government is the single payer and owns almost all 
providers operating within the NHS. About 10% of the 
NHS budget is spent on non-NHS providers (mainly 
providers of community services not hospitals), and 
importantly there is a set system of national prices (the 
national tariff) covering about 60% of services. NHS staff 
is contracted to the NHS, including doctors who are sala-
ried. Primary care practitioners are self-employed but 
almost all work 100% under contract to the NHS. These 
are important and effective methods of cost control in 
what could be seen as a government-funded, free, and 
open-ended system. Establishing UHC in LMICs will 
require incremental increases in public expenditure, 
and cost control is a key area of focus for governments 
to ensure highest return on investment. Mismanagement 
and ineffective investment decisions can result in cost 
escalation without translation into better healthcare for 
populations.
The NHS regularly tops polls as the most important 
issue facing Britain. What is clear is that the public 
strongly support the security of UHC; employers are not 
burdened by mandatory health taxes as in the case of 
employer-funded systems. Though most people living in 
England were dissatisfied with the way the NHS operated 
in 1997, public perception has since greatly improved, 
peaking at a 70% by 2010,6 and reaching 57% in 2017.7 
Rises in satisfaction have been observed during a period 
with enhanced government funding and attention to 
improve healthcare quality, particularly since 2000. The 
continuous efforts, on the part of different governments, 
show that the political willingness to drive healthcare 
improvements is essential. The same principle applies to 
LMICs.8 Political willingness, determination and vision 
are paramount, and progress has been made for example 
through such global and national-level initiatives as the 
2015 United Nations resolution for UHC, the introduc-
tion of the 2017 National Health Policy in India, or Rwan-
da’s Vision 2020.
exAmpleS of STrengTHenIng HeAlTHCAre quAlITy In THe 
englISH nHS: WHAT Are Some poTenTIAl leSSonS for 
lmICS?
The NHS is well known internationally as a system in 
which a lot of new initiatives to improve quality are tested, 
as recognised by the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development in its 2016 review of health-
care systems.9 While the list of initiatives is impressive, 
more work needs to be done on developing a coherent 
strategy shown to improve quality.10 Adopted initiatives 
include tighter accountability for quality in providers by 
clinicians through a process known as ‘clinical govern-
ance’ from 1998, to a national systematic approach to 
developing evidence-based clinical guidelines for new 
treatments (through the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE)), to regulation of quality 
through inspection and publicly reported ratings, to 
performance-related financial incentives for quality. 
Though admittedly a very different context and level of 
resourcing, all of these contain lessons for healthcare 
systems in LMICs. There have been demonstrable bene-
fits but, with varying levels of investment required, and 
with varying risks and unintended consequences, exam-
ples of which are illustrated here.
prevention
To improve primary disease prevention, England has 
introduced a number of strict polices,11 such as raising 
the minimum age for the purchase of tobacco products, 
imposing minimum unit pricing for alcohol, or intro-
ducing a soft drinks industry levy. A public smoking ban, 
introduced in 2007, has resulted in significant reductions 
in smoking-related heart disease (−20.8%) and stroke 
(−14.5%).12 Due to a system of local government, many 
councils can use planning and other regulations to act in 
the absence of national government action, for example, 
in not allowing fast and junk food outlets to set up outside 
schools. This action has required political leadership in 
the face of lobbying from some well-resourced interest 
groups, and in some cases cross-ministry collaboration. 
Evidence to support the case for change is critical, but 
overwhelmingly the issue is political leadership. Too often 
LMICs have been unable to overcome these obstacles to 
take action to adopt prevention policies, such as those 
evidence-based ‘best-buy’ interventions recommended 
by WHO.13 However, there are positive examples where 
governments have introduced primary disease preven-
tion programmes, for instance, the 2017 alcohol taxa-
tion and drink-driving laws in Malawi,14 or a 2009 obesity 
prevention programme that addressed food formulation 
and advertising regulations for children in Brazil.15
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Policy makers in the NHS have long identified 
secondary prevention as a key opportunity to prevent the 
occurrence of costly complications. For instance, primary 
care practitioners are financially incentivised to carry out 
a range of services such as wellness checks, vaccinations 
and be proactive in structured chronic disease manage-
ment (ie, structured disease management refers to a 
framework of evidence-based best practice to guide the 
clinician). An example of the latter is the care of patients 
with diabetes, which includes regular assessments of 
body mass index, HbA1c level and foot examinations.16 
Standardising clinical assessments through checklists 
ensures that patients at risk of developing complications 
are identified early on, in turn allowing for a need-based 
treatment response and an ultimately improved quality 
of patient care.17 While financial rewards for primary 
care practitioners through the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework in England were found to be effective on 
some indicators such as emergency admissions, retention 
of primary practitioners, and also improved IT and data 
collection, they had no impact on mortality rates and 
other performance measures.18 Based on this evidence,19 
LMICs should consider carefully the aims and underlying 
theories prior to adopting incentive schemes. However, 
for the past decade, performance-based finance schemes 
have been introduced widely across LMICs in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, though with mixed results.20
priority setting: developing an evidence base to help
To ensure that services are cost-effective and of high 
quality, NICE was set up as a government-funded inde-
pendent authority in 1999, offering robust evidence-
based guidance and recommendations on the adoption 
of cost-effective care, specifically: on the best practice 
treatment of specific conditions; on the use of medicines; 
on public health and social care; and on safe staffing levels 
in providers. NICE guidance is mandatory in some areas, 
and its use is assessed through analysis of national audit 
or disease registry data that is government funded. For 
new medicines, NICE assesses against an explicit cost-ef-
fectiveness threshold and makes recommendations. This 
way rationing decisions for expensive new drugs have a 
strong empirical evidence base, and this helps providers 
and policy makers who often face high-pressure from 
groups demanding high-cost treatments of uncertain or 
seemingly marginal benefit.
Population need varies by country, making it impos-
sible to recommend a one-size-fits-all strategy, and 
priority setting should be based on evidence to avoid 
neglecting important health areas, or prioritising other 
areas simply because they are high profile.21 Yet, for many 
LMICs, there is benefit in borrowing analysis from NICE 
and other similar bodies internationally to help set prior-
ities. A good example is the recent national Standard 
Treatment Guidelines on Diabetic Foot based on NICE 
guidelines published in India.22 At present, only a few 
LMICs have functioning priority setting institutions, such 
as the Health Intervention and Technology Assessment 
Program in Thailand and CONITEC in Brazil, while a 
number of others such as China, India and the Philip-
pines are moving in this direction.23–25 LMICs can learn 
and borrow from NICE, for example, through the Inter-
national Decision Support Initiative.26
Target setting and monitoring for enhanced performance
The NHS over the years has invested in large datasets 
routinely collected to monitor the quality of care and 
performance of providers. Performance of existing 
healthcare services can be improved by setting national 
performance targets, in collaboration with clinicians and 
patients, with robust evidence, clear accountability and a 
wide set of metrics as a prerequisite for target success.27 
For example, introducing national performance targets 
in conjunction with other initiatives resulted in a rapid 
and sustained reduction in healthcare-associated infec-
tions.
However, the impact and cost-effectiveness of NHS 
targets has been controversial for several reasons: it 
has resulted in some unintended consequences such as 
inefficient behaviours to meet targets, a sense of being 
‘blamed and shamed’ on the part of institutional and 
individual providers, and adverse effects on care not 
covered by the target.28 However, the global literature 
shows some positive effect of measurement and public 
reporting of performance across countries where it has 
been implemented.29 30
Pay-for-performance can be used within the wider 
healthcare system to improve quality of care, such as 
in NHS primary care through the financial incentive 
to report and perform clinical assessments, and also in 
secondary care through targeted hospital performance 
measures like readmission rates.31–33 As with target setting, 
unintended consequences and perverse outcomes need 
to be anticipated and closely monitored, presenting 
big implementation challenges for LMICs.34 The lesson 
learnt from the NHS is that governments in LMICs 
should be careful in opting for introducing targets and 
pay-for-performance schemes, a perspective supported by 
a recent review recommending their abolishment due to 
the associated high-level of resource use.34 For example, 
the operating cost of a model introduced in Burkina Faso 
was found to account for 30% of the overall cost of the 
scheme, which arguably could result in greater benefit if 
invested elsewhere.
Integrated, coordinated care
A policy thrust over the past 4 years has been to boost 
growth in investment in primary care over hospital care 
and to encourage the NHS to coordinate care more, 
in particular between the separate sectors of hospital 
and primary care on the one hand, and NHS health-
care and local social care on the other. The key strategy 
here has been set out in the NHS Five Year Forward 
View,35 and the policy has been to incentivise providers 
to work more closely with one another, share informa-
tion about patients, in order to manage their care in a 
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more coordinated way, improve wellness, and to reduce 
the risk of costly hospitalisation. Case integration is also 
widespread across other parts of Europe (ie, Sweden)36 
and North America (ie, Accountable Care Organisations 
in the USA)37 as an attempt to curb cost growth and 
increase value of the care provided, and lessons could be 
learnt from their experience. The strategy in the English 
NHS is a well-structured variant that LMICs might find 
useful, in particular the priority to boost investment in 
primary care and give incentives to hospitals to work to 
reduce avoidable admissions.
Many LMICs still suffer from a high prevalence of infec-
tious diseases and together with help of donor funding 
have developed strategies to improve capacity to deliver 
healthcare over the past decade. Extending existing 
delivery platforms such as community services employed 
for HIV and malaria testing to include services for detec-
tion and treatment of NCDs could provide an opportu-
nity for health systems to improve patient care and also 
to alleviate pressure from hospital services. Ensuring inte-
gration between a functioning primary care system and 
disease control programme was found to be effective in 
improving population health in Costa Rica.38
regulation of quality
The NHS has a sophisticated system of regulation—of 
individual professionals and also of providers of care. 
In England, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) moni-
tors, inspects and regulates most health and social care 
services. Findings are made available publicly, including 
ratings for each provider, to help people choose care 
based on direct provider comparisons. Covering about 
8000 primary care practices, 17 000 providers of social 
care and 250 NHS hospitals, as well as the relatively small 
number of non-NHS healthcare facilities, the CQC’s 
work is extensive, and it has had a significant impact on 
providers to increase the quality of care. The CQC is 
funded in part through government and in part through 
mandatory fees charged to the providers being regulated, 
and providers are not allowed to operate unless they are 
regulated by the CQC. In many other countries, there are 
government or private bodies that use routinely collected 
data to rate providers on the quality of care. What is 
unusual about the CQC is that it inspects providers 
using a systematic method, therefore picking up infor-
mation that cannot be gleaned through using routinely 
collected quantitative data alone and is independent of 
vested interests. It also uses sophisticated data-driven 
methods to identify providers at high risk to prioritise its 
inspection programme, and importantly, inspectors also 
include patients—‘experts by experience’.
Although every healthcare system will have aspects of 
care that are flawed, objective and routinely performed 
assessments are an important aspect of controlling 
and ensuring the provision of good quality healthcare 
services. While quantitative assessments to determine 
providers in need of inspections through the use of 
routine data can be affected by gaming, having a system 
that combines both quantitative and qualitative inspec-
tions across a wide range of quality indicators will help 
limit abuse of the system. LMICs might find it useful 
to adopt a similar structure to the CQC in England, 
but they should be aware that any inspection system 
requires substantial financial investments. Several regu-
latory processes to examine the quality of healthcare 
facilities exist across LMICs. For instance, Rwanda intro-
duced quality check lists completed by health centres 
on a monthly basis and verified through unannounced 
quarterly inspections by members of the district health 
management.39
Investing in people
Ensuring that healthcare systems are equipped with 
the right skill-mix is fundamental to providing efficient 
and sustainable healthcare. In the past, the NHS bene-
fitted and encouraged migration of high-skilled medical 
professionals, but in light of rising demands and political 
uncertainty, not least following the referendum to leave 
the European Union, has faced challenges in recruiting 
and retaining the required number of clinical staff.
One way to increase productivity within the existing 
workforce is task-shifting where traditional doctor roles 
are reassigned to other staff, for example, supported with 
the use of decision aids available through technology. 
For example, Clinical Nurse Specialists in the NHS have 
demonstrated many benefits: reduction in emergency 
bed days, follow-up appointments, primary care visits and 
medication errors, as well as high levels of patient satis-
faction. Moreover, Emergency Care Practitioners trained 
to triage, diagnose and treat common emergencies make 
safe decisions and reduce admissions to hospital. Task-
shifting is a cost-effective way to address human resource 
challenges40 and may also entail patient empowerment 
to improve self-care abilities. Ideally, investment in tech-
nology should prioritise where technology can support 
this type of task-shift to staff with lower levels of formal 
qualifications, or even to patients themselves.
It is well recognised that many LMICs experience 
dramatic staff shortages and significant problems with 
staff retention in rural areas. This has resulted in imple-
mentation problems of planned quality improvement 
interventions, driven by factors such as inadequate 
training resources, unsatisfactory working conditions 
and an imbalance between urban and rural staffing 
levels. To tackle this human resource crisis, many LMICs 
have developed strategies including the National Human 
Resources for Health Strategic Plan by the Zambian 
Ministry of Health41 or the Afghanistan National Health 
Workforce Plan.42 Most of the proposed initiatives refer 
to improved professional development opportunities 
and financial incentives for staff retention in rural areas, 
but based on experience from the NHS, there is substan-
tial scope for task-shifting within the existing workforce, 
which can create an environment that is conducive to 
staff and patient empowerment.
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ConCluSIon
Achieving high-quality UHC in LMICs remains a chal-
lenging task, and while governments have shown clear 
political willingness to reach this goal by 2030, many 
obstacles will have to be overcome. Learning from experi-
ences of functioning UHCs can provide useful insights on 
how to address existing challenges. This article proposes 
the copying of principles and values, rather than direct 
transfers of NHS policies.
Securing a high-quality UHC requires strong polit-
ical leadership, and at times where UHC provided by 
the NHS was under doubt in the late 1990s, key policies 
such as a notion of clinical governance, NICE and the 
predecessor of the CQC were introduced with a focus 
on improving quality and reducing variation.43 It is this 
timeframe that might prove particularly useful and inspi-
rational to LMICs, as it shows how leadership and drive 
to renew the value of UHC led to an unprecedented 
level of innovation. As political leaders, and finance and 
health ministries in LMICs negotiate their path forwards, 
this analysis paper gives some points of learning from the 
NHS, a healthcare system that has provided high-quality 
UHC for over 70 years.
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